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THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBIITY
Arnold W. Green'
I
It is the thesis of this paper that many modern criminologists
have injected more than semantic confusion into their body of
theory by simultaneously using the concept "responsibility" on two
different levels of meaning. This practice has no logical consistency
or scientific validity, is consistent and valid only in terms of
humanitarian value-judgments, as will be demonstrated.
With the effective refutation of all "free will" theories of
personality, and the wide-spread acceptance among social scientists
of deterministic theories of conduct in terms of heredity and life-
experience, the realization has dawned that from a strictly scien-
tific point of view it is absolutely impossible to attach praise or
blame to any individual act. Probably more than any other group
of social scientists, students of criminality are acutely aware
of this. 2
But demonstrating the invalidity of "free will" has a limited
applicability. Life, in all societies of which we are cognizant, is
made up of a system of rights and duties, differentiated according
to class, sex, age, etc., for the various segments of a given popula-
tion. These rights and duties are arbitrarily prescribed, to indi-
viduals and groups. Some philosophy, or, if you will, series of
rationalizations, always buttresses the system.
The system of rights and duties could not function if the indi-
vidual were not held responsible for his actions. But the meaning
of the term has been shifted: as used above, "responsibility" ex-
plicitly refers to some mysterious "inner power" over "individual
destiny", which most criminologists justifiably deny; here, refer-
ence is made to man's being held accountable for his personal
I U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
2 "Man is no more 'responsible' for becoming wilful and committing a crime
than the flower for becoming red and fragrant. In both instances the end
products are predetermined by the nature of the protoplasm and the chance of
circumstances." Nathaniel F. Cantor, Crime, Criminals, and Criminal Justice,
Henry Holt & Co., 1932, p. 266.
"The point to be grasped is that the formation of the personality pattern is
a natural product of forces in the constitution of the individual and in his
childhood situation." Clifford R. Shaw, The Jack-Roller, University of Chicago
Press, 1930, p. 193. The quotation is from a discussion by Ernest W. Burgess,
pp. 184-197.
"The human animal finds his conduct and his thoughts determined by the
combined influences of his biological heredity and his social surroundings.
There is not the slightest iota of choice allowed to any individual from birth to
the grave!' Harry E. Barnes, The Story of Punishment, Stratford Co., Boston,
1930, p. 250.
This deterministic view of human behavior is found throughout the
criminological literature. The author has collected many similar quotations, but
little would be served by listing more.
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behavior. The first is a fiction, the second a fact necessary to
society's functioning. The first is a. rationalization, used to
buttress the system of rights and duties, the second is the very
corner-stone of the system's structure.
Although some fiction, some non-logical explanation, is neces-
sary to inculcate a given society's system of rights and duties, it
need not necessarily be the idea of "responsibility" (free will)
current in our society. If displaced, a new fiction would supplant
it. "Responsibility" as personal accountability is, however, a dif-
ferent matter. Only on the basis of personal accountability can
prediction of behavior take place, without which all social relations
would be impossible.
We know, for example, that A will act thus and so in a given
situation because his deviation from expected behavior would
redound to his discredit or disadvantage, in a word, punishment, in
the form of loss of reputation, ridicule, or in extreme cases, ex-
pulsion from the group in which he is' currently interacting. Only
by accepting responsibility (accountability) for his actions can the
individual invoke upon his fellows their common system of rights
and duties, offer them the assurance of being able to predict his
future behavior on the basis of his past and present actions, and
thus preserve the relationship.
But when the humanitarian criminologist refutes the concept
of responsibility (free will), he is attempting to relieve the criminal
of responsibility (accountability).3 It is difficult to see how the
humanitarian criminologist is to achieve this goal when non-
criminals are, and must be, held accountable for their behavior
in the home, at school, on the job. The humanitarian criminologist
is making the fundamental error of positing a specialized treatment
for those who have violated society's norms most flagrantly, a
specialized treatment it would be impossible to accord the general
population.4
3 "The hope lies int the gradual acceptance by the community of a philosophy
of protection instead of that of vindictive punishment of the offending in-
dividual... ." George W. Kirchwey, "The Prison's Place In The Penal System,"
The Annals, 1931 (v. 157), pp. 13-22, p. 22.
"The legal and institutional provisions for the protection of society should
be based not so much upon the gravity of the act for which the offender happens
to be on trial, as upon his social dangerousness, his assets and liabilities, and
his probable and actual response to correctional treatment." Sheldon Glueck,
Crime And Justice, Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 1936, pp. 214-215.
As in footnote 1, the above listing could be indefinitely extended.
4 Not all modern criminologists are so blinded by humanitarian value-judgments that they conceive of organized society as a vast super social-
agency which should be devoted to relieving its aberrant members from account-
ing for their actions. At least one criminologist recognizes the dynamic im-
portance of a sense of responsibility (accountability) in the overt criminal, in
terms of his rehabilitation potential: "As a way of justifying themselves,
inmates usually trace responsibility for their acts to some circumstance other
than their own volition .... Human experience has shown also that the sense
of personal responsibility plays an important role in regulating, action. Par-
ticularly with individuals on a low cultural level, who are seeking to explain
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The difficulty in attacking the humanitarian value-judgments
and pseudo-logic of social reformers is that one runs the danger
of being labeled a reactionary, and in this instance, of "advocating
punishment". But this is not so. While the author agrees with
Emile Durkheim and George H. Mead 5 that the function of punish-
ment is far more subtle and deep-rooted in social organization than
the humanitarian criminologist is aware of when he blandly
proposes banishing it as archaic and irrational, no one knows what
the "most effective" forms of punishment are as apart from specific
situations and specific goals.
Certainly, without punishment, organized society is inconceiv-
able. Accountability for personal action ceases to exist when
sanctions are not applied. But the realization of this is not neces-
sarily followed by advocating cruel and unusual punishments.
Those criminologists who have pointed out that extremely harsh
punishment has historically been associated with periods of ex-
cessive criminality cannot be refuted. And yet, on the other hand,
that some forms of punishment are necessary to a functioning
social order cannot be gainsaid.
Finally, the humanitarian criminologist's lack of certitude
about justice,6 even the justification of punishment, is in and of
itself symptomatic of a social order that is lacking certitude, lack-
ing vigorous belief in its own tenets, faiths, its own entire way of
life. The anguished fulminations of the humanitarian criminol-
ogist are part and parcel of that uncertainty, indeed, of the very
complex of causes in which much of modern criminality is rooted.
away their own responsibility, it is necessary that this factor receive attention
through proper definition and emphasis." Henry E. Field, "The Attitudes of
Prisoners As A Factor in Rehabilitation," The Annals, 1931 (v. 157), pp. 150-
163, pp. 160-161.
5 Briefly paraphrased, these men see punishment as the affirmation of moral
standards, as functioning to re-enforce the given society's values. Punishment
serves to set off wrong from right. That in some instances it may have no
effect whatsoever on the rehabilitation of the individual offender is, in this
context, entirely beside the point.
a A popular accusation among humanitarian criminologists is that society,
not the individual offender, is the criminal.
